



# **SPIFFE AND SPIRE IN PRACTICE**

---

DANIEL FELDMAN

UMAIR KHAN

# AGENDA

---

1

RECAP: SPIFFE AND SPIRE

2

SECURE MICROSERVICES COMMUNICATION

3

BUILD AND BRIDGE SERVICE MESH

4

AUTHENTICATE SECURELY TO COMMON PLATFORMS

5

AUTHENTICATION FOR ZERO TRUST SECURITY

6

REDUCING THE RISK OF ROGUE CONTAINERS



# **SPIFFE AND SPIRE INTRODUCTION**

---



# INTRODUCING SPIFFE AND SPIRE




Open-source  
specification and  
toolchain for service  
identity



Part of CNCF





Integrated into various  
open-source projects



Extensive contributions  
by HPE and other top  
tech companies

# CROSS-SERVICE COMMUNICATION IS EXPLODING

Increasing attack surface & risk of leakage across untrusted networks





**A hacker gained access to 100 million Capital One credit card applications and accounts**

By Rob McLean, [CNN Business](#)  
Updated 5:17 PM ET, Tue July 30, 2019

**Long-lived service credentials exist across applications, repositories, platforms, and tools, making them ripe for theft.**

# CROSS-SERVICE COMMUNICATION IS EXPLODING

Increasing operational complexity and reducing developer velocity



# SOLVING THE “BOTTOM TURTLE”



**Service  
Certificate**



**Platform Secret  
Store**



**Platform Identity**



**Initial Configuration?**

**SOURCE: SOLVING THE BOTTOM TURTLE: [WWW.SPIFFE.IO/BOOK](http://WWW.SPIFFE.IO/BOOK)**

# SOLVING THE “BOTTOM TURTLE”



**Service  
Certificate**



**Platform Secret  
Store**



**Platform Identity**



**Initial Configuration?**

SOURCE: SOLVING THE BOTTOM TURTLE: [WWW.SPIFFY.COM/BOOK](http://WWW.SPIFFY.COM/BOOK)



# SPIFFE KEY CONCEPTS

---

## SPIFFE ID



Standard format for a service identifier

`spiffe://trustdomain/service`

## SPIFFE VERIFIABLE IDENTITY DOCUMENT



Cryptographically verifiable document  
asserting a SPIFFE ID

## TRUST BUNDLE



Set of public keys used to verify SVIDs

## WORKLOAD API




Local API for workloads to retrieve their  
SPIFFE IDs, SVIDs, and Trust Bundles

# SPIRE

## Core Differentiators

### MULTI-FACTOR ATTESTATION



Has it been signed by the CI/CD pipeline?



Is it known to trusted middleware or schedulers?




Is the machine a member of a known network or cluster?



Can we affirm the integrity of the machine it runs upon?

- Real time, attestation engine issues and validates cryptographic service identifies (SPIFFE) based on multiple factor policy
- Eliminates the need for secret management

### AUTOMATED LIFECYCLE MANAGEMENT



- Automatically issues, distributes, and renews short-live credentials
- Reduces operational overhead associated with credential management

### EXTENSIBLE, WEB-SCALE ARCHITECTURE



- Easily extends to identity providers, certificate authorities, and systems
- Designed for dynamic, distributed environments




# SECURE MICROSERVICES COMMUNICATION

---



# SECURE MICROSERVICES COMMUNICATION



---



# SECURE MICROSERVICES COMMUNICATION




Cloud or Kubernetes Platform




# SECURE MICROSERVICES COMMUNICATION



Cloud or Kubernetes Platform




# SECURE MICROSERVICES COMMUNICATION




# IMPLEMENTATION OPTIONS


Directly Use  
Workload API



SPIFFE  
Helper



Envoy Proxy





## SERVICE MESH COMPARISON

---

- Works across different service meshes and outside service meshes
- Can do hardware-level or cloud-level attestation
- More fine-grained control over certificates



## UBER: SECURING NEXT-GEN AND LEGACY INFRASTRUCTURE

---

“SPIRE is now a key component of Uber's next infrastructure, but we are also using a side-car approach to **retrofit authentication into legacy infrastructure**. While SPIFFE and SPIRE are commonly known to work in modern, cloud native architectures, we can adapt the projects to our proprietary legacy stack quickly. SPIRE can **provide a critical bridge of trust within Uber's next-gen and legacy infrastructure** and positively impact internal security and developer efficiency”

Ryan Turner, Software Engineer 2, Uber

# **BUILD AND BRIDGE SERVICE MESH**



---





# BUILD AND BRIDGE SERVICE MESH




## Service Mesh



# BUILD AND BRIDGE SERVICE MESH



# BUILD AND BRIDGE SERVICE MESH



## SOME EXAMPLES

---

- AWS App Mesh
- GreyMatter
- Istio
- Kuma
- Network Service Mesh
- NGINX Service Mesh
- Open Service Mesh



# **AUTHENTICATE SECURELY TO DATABASES OR CLOUD PLATFORM**

---






# AUTHENTICATE TO COMMON DATABASES OR CLOUD PLATFORMS

Reduce reliance on passwords or API keys

Using usernames/passwords or tokens to access resources outside Kubernetes e.g. Datastores

- Risk of breach is higher
- Need to generate/manage credentials




# AUTHENTICATE TO COMMON DATABASES OR CLOUD PLATFORMS


Reduce reliance on passwords or API keys

## With SPIRE you can:


- Eliminate the need to generate and manage distinct shared secrets for each cloud platform for each application.
- Scale, secure identity-driven authentication across all cloud providers and platforms.



# AUTHENTICATE TO AWS



# AUTHENTICATE TO POSTGRESQL



**Spiffe-helper pushes certificates into PostgreSQL**  
**Services can authenticate as PostgreSQL users**



## SCROOGE MCBANK: CUSTOMER PORTAL

🖱️ Your current balance is 9.65


Description	Debit	Credit
Daily parking	\$20	
Gliderport Paragliding	\$165	
San Diego Zoo Daily pass	\$65	
Airline Compensation		\$300
Carne Asada Street Tacos	\$24.65	
Coin-Op Game Room	\$35	

# AUTHENTICATION FOR ZERO TRUST SECURITY MODEL

---



# PERIMETER SECURITY



As we add:


- services
- datacenters
- clouds
- regions inside clouds

perimeter security becomes increasingly untenable

# CLOUD AND CONTAINERS DRIVING ADOPTION OF ZERO TRUST

Traditional network based security models don't work in modern software architectures

## Perimeter based



- Attempts to build a trusted “wall”
- Relies on IP addresses or physical locations
- Difficult to implement for today's dynamic environments


## Zero Trust



- Assumes “bad guys” are everywhere
- Uses cryptographic identities for authenticating every system/user
- Enables universal enforcement across hybrid infrastructures



# SPIFFE IS FOUNDATIONAL FOR ZERO TRUST SECURITY MODEL



Each service gets its own

- unique
- secure
- provable identity



## ANTHEM: BUILDING A FOUNDATION FOR ZERO TRUST IN HEALTHCARE

---

“We **could not rely on traditional parameter-based** security tools and processes to secure our next-generation applications and infrastructure. **Zero trust**, a fine-grained, automated approach to security, made a lot of sense to us, especially in the future, as we plan to **operate across organizational boundaries and cloud providers**. Identity and authentication for both users and services are among the zero trust security model’s core principles. Zero trust allows us to rely less on network-based controls than authenticating every system or workload. **SPIFFE and SPIRE have enabled a foundational authentication layer** for our zero trust security architecture. They allow each workload to cryptographically prove “who they are” before they start communicating”

Bobby Samuel, VP AI Engineering, Anthem


# REDUCING THE RISK OF ROGUE CONTAINERS

---




# CHALLENGE : REDUCE RISK OF ROGUE CONTAINERS

Attackers can insert new containers or workloads




# SOLUTION: BINARY ATTESTATION WITH SPIRE




- Each time the CI/CD system builds a container image, it sends the container hash to SPIRE
- SPIRE then checks the container hash each time it grants an identity document
- This guarantees attackers can't insert new containers, modify containers in the container registry, or bypass CI/CD security checks

# CHALLENGE : SERVICE DISRUPTION DUE TO MISCONFIGURATION



# SOLUTION: REDUCE RISK OF MISCONFIGURATION



## SEPARATE TRUST DOMAINS

Use separate SPIRE domains for dev and prod workloads, in order to ensure isolation of prod workloads.



## TRANSPARENT AUTHENTICATION HAS SIMPLIFIED OPERATIONS

---

“With SPIRE we can deploy a **consistent, “dial-tone” authentication** across all our platforms. The burden of authentication and security is now **encapsulated from the developers** so they can focus on business or application logic. This has improved our deployment velocity overall. We are also **less likely to get “production errors” due to configuration** issues such as using development credentials in production. Standardized authentication with SPIRE has also **simplified compliance and audit** since we have mutual TLS across trust domains and platforms.

Eli Nesterov, Security Engineering Manager, ByteDance



# THANK YOU

---



[Slack.spiffe.io](https://slack.spiffe.io)



[SPIFFE.io](https://spiffe.io)



[spiffe.io/book](https://spiffe.io/book)



[github.com/spiffe](https://github.com/spiffe)