

# Mitigating Kubernetes Attacks

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
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#### Agenda

- Kubernetes and container attacks: real-world examples
- Kubernetes threats: what's different?
- Kubernetes attack matrix: overview
- Adversarial tactics and techniques: main themes
- Key takeaways and recommendations



#### Kubernetes attacks in the wild





#### StackRox research

- Honeypot setup
  - Large GKE clusters running hundreds of containerized apps exposed to the Internet for 5 months
  - Used popular images with known vulnerabilities and deployed with weak configurations
- Threats look similar to those that affect non-containerized applications
- Observed attacker actions
  - Injection attempts to download a file into /tmp/
  - Attempted downloads using wget
  - Intrusion attempts frequently occurring on well-known web ports
  - Attempted commands to gain additional targeting data or download binaries




#### What's different about Kubernetes threats

- New attack surface
  - Kubernetes control plane
  - Cluster worker nodes
- · Application components are highly distributed, dynamic, and ephemeral
- Increased operational complexity
- Broader impact due to orchestration and automation



#### Kubernetes attack matrix: an overview

- Published by Microsoft Azure
- Part of ecosystem's continued focus on security
  - Kubernetes security audit
  - SIGs
  - NIST SP 800-190
  - CIS Kubernetes Benchmark
- Based on MITRE ATT&CK® framework





#### MITRE ATT&CK® framework

- Knowledge base of adversarial tactics and techniques
- Use to categorize attack vectors and gauge their level of risk
- Based on real-world observations

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	CredentialAccess	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Exfiltration	Command and Control
Valid Accounts		Scheduled Task		XSL Script Processing	Netwo	rk Sniffing	Windows Remote	Video Capture	Scheduled Transfer	Web Service
Trusted Relationship		rap		Injection	Two-Factor Authentication	System Time Discovery	Management	Screen Capture	Exfiltration Over	Uncommonly Used Port
Supply Chain Compromise		Driver		Memory Injection	Interception	System Service Discovery	Third-party Software	Man in the Browser	Physical Medium	Standard Non-Application
Spearphishing via Service		Scheduling		ccount Control	Private Keys	System Owner/User	Taint Shared Content	Input Capture	Exfiltration Over Command	Layer Protocol
Spearphishing Link		nchetl		Manipulation	Password Filter DLL	Discovery	SSH Hijacking	Email Collection	and Control Channel	Standard Application
Spearphishing Attachment	XSL Script Processing		Valid Accounts		LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning	System Network	Shared Webroot	Data Staged	Data Transfer Size Limits	Layer Protocol
Replication Through	Windows Remote		Plist Modification		Keychain	Configuration Discovery	Replication Through	Data from Removable Media	Data Encrypted	Remote Access Tools
Removable Media	Management User Execution		mage File Execution Options Inject DLL Search Order Hijacking	on	Kerberoasting Input Prompt	Security Software Discovery Remote System Discovery	Removable Media Remote File Copy	Data from Network Shared Drive	Data Compressed Automated Exfiltration	Port Knocking Multilayer Encryption
Exploit Public-Facing Application	Trusted Developer Utilities	18146	Shell	Web Service	Input Prompt Input Capture	Query Registry	Remote Prie Copy  Remote Desktop Protocol	Data from Information	Exfiltration Over Other	Multiband Communication
Hardware Additions	Third-party Software		p Items	Trusted Developer Utilities	Hooking	Process Discovery	Pass the Ticket	Data from Information Repositories	Network Medium	Multi-Stage Channels
Drive-by Compromise	Space after Filename		nd Seteid	Timestomp	Forced Authentication	Permission Groups Discovery	Pass the Hash	Automated Collection	Exfiltration Over	Multi-hop Proxy
and by compression	Source		rmissions Weakness	Template Injection	Exploitation for	Peripheral Device Discovery	Logon Scripts	Audio Capture	Alternative Protocol	Fallback Channels
	Signed Script	Port M	tonitors	Space after Filename	Credential Access	Password Policy Discovery	Exploitation of	Data from Local System		Domain Fronting
	Proxy Execution	Path Into	erception	Software Packing	Credentials in Files	Network Share Discovery	Remote Services	Clipboard Data		Data Obfuscation
	Service Execution	New 5		SIP and Trust	Credential Dumping	Network Service Scanning	Application Deployment			Data Encoding
	Scripting	Launch	Daemon	Provider Hijacking	Brute Force	File and Directory Discovery	Software			Custom Cryptographic
	Rundli32	Hoc	oking	Signed Binary	Bash History	Browser Bookmark Discovery	Windows Admin Shares			Protocol
	Regsvr32	File System Perm	vissions Weakness	Proxy Execution	Account Manipulation	Application Window	Remote Services			Connection Proxy
	Regsvcs/Regasm	Dylib H	iijacking	Rundli32	Securityd Memory	Discovery	Distributed Component			Communication Through
	PowerShell	Application		Rootkit	Credentials in Registry	System Network	Object Model	1		Removable Media
	Mshta	Appin		Regsvr32		Connections Discovery	AppleScript	_		Standard Cryptographic
	InstallUtil		ert DLLs	Regsvcs/Regasm		System Information				Protocol
	Graphical User Interface		ty Features	Redundant Access		Discovery				Remote File Copy
	Exploitation for	Winlogon Helper DLL	Sudo Caching	Process Hollowing		Account Discovery				Custom Command and
	Client Execution	Windows Management	Sudo	Process Doppelganging						Control Protocol
	Execution through API	Instrumentation	SID-History Injection	Port Knocking						Commonly Used Port
	Dynamic Data Exchange	Event Subscription	Exploitation for	Obfuscated Files						
	Control Panel Items Compiled HTML File	SIP and Trust Provider	Privilege Escalation	or Information						
		Hijacking	1	Network Share Connection Removal						
	Command-Line Interface CMSTP	Security Support Provider Screensaver	1	Modify Registry						
	AppleScript	Registry Run	1	Masquerading						
	Windows Management	Keys / Startup Folder		LC_MAIN Hijacking	1					
	Instrumentation	Re-opened Applications	1	Launchetl						
	Signed Binary	Rc.common	1	InstallUtil	1					
	Proxy Execution	Port Knocking	1	Install Root Certificate						
	Execution through	Office Application Startup	1	Indirect Command Execution						
	Module Load	Netsh Helper DLL	]	Component Firmware						
		Modify Existing Service	]	Indicator Removal from Tools						
		Logon Scripts		Indicator Blocking					D. 1 / 7714	
		Login Item		HISTCONTROL		I ho	MIIDE	ATT&	I IVI	
		LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition	1	Hidden Window		1116	LITTO	AIIQU	~I\	
		Launch Agent	-	Hidden Users						
		Kernel Modules		Hidden Files and Directories		Lnto	Modico	Framev	104/2	
		and Extensions	1	Gatekeeper Bypass		FNIE	rnrise	Framev	V()FK	
		Hidden Files and Directories	1	File System Logical Offsets			PINC	· · aiiici	10111	
		External Remote Services Create Account	1	File Permissions Modification File Deletion			=			
		Component Object Model	1	Exploitation for						
		Component Object Model Hijacking		Defense Evasion						
		Change Default	1	Disabiling Security Tools		attacl	c.mitre.o	MAPE		
		File Association		Deobfuscate/Decode Files		attati	c.iiiitre.o	ry		
		Bootkit	1	or Information						
		BITS Jobs	1	Control Panel Items	1					
		Authentication Package	1	Component Object						
		Account Manipulation	1	Model Hijacking						
		.bash_profile and .bashrc		Compiled HTML File						
		Time Providers		Code Signing						
		System Firmware		CMSTP						
		Shortcut Modification	-	Clear Command History						
		Redundant Access	-	BITS Jobs						
		Hypervisor	-	Signed Script Proxy Execution						
		Component Firmware	1	Scripting NTFS File Attributes						
		Browser Extensions	J	NTFS File Attributes Mshta						
				Indicator Removal on Host						
				DLL Side-Loading						
				DLL Side-Loading DCShadow	© 2019 The N	fITRE Corporation. All rights re-	served. Approved for Public Re	elease; Distribution Unlimited. C	ase Number 15-1288.	<b>MITRE</b>



#### Tactics and techniques of the attack matrix

- 9 tactics, 40 techniques
- Tactics: the "why" behind a particular technique
- Techniques: specific offensive actions the "how" for a given objective
- Some techniques can be classified under multiple tactics
- A technique may warrant multiple, different mitigations



### Examples: 1.4 Application vulnerability, 2.4. Application exploit

- Scan container images for vulnerabilities
- Use admission control to prevent containers with high-severity vulnerabilities
   from launching
- Configure Network Policies to limit external access to pods
- Restrict service account permissions using Kubernetes RBAC
- Do not allow pods to run as root
- Set up filesystem as read-only
- Minimize container access to underlying host



#### Your best protection: apply native Kubernetes controls





## **Step 1: Configure Kubernetes RBAC**

- Limit who has the cluster-admin role in your organization
- Adopt a least-privilege model for service accounts and their role bindings
- Avoid complexity in role aggregation or overlap in role definitions




The Kubernetes attack matrix extends the ATT&CK framework for the first time to Kubernetes to describe a total of 40 different techniques that fall under nine different tactics.





### Ensure you monitor your RBAC settings





#### **Step 2: Configure Network Policies**

- Use a CNI that implements the NetworkPolicy API and create policies that restrict pod traffic
- Start by applying a default-deny-all network policy
- Explicitly allow necessary Internet access and pod-to-pod communication




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Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Impact
Using cloud credentials	Exec into container	Backdoor container	Pfivileged continuer	Clear container logs	List k8s secrets	Access the k8s API server	Access cloud resources	Data destruction
Compromised images in registry	bash/cmd inside container	Writable hostPath mount	Cluster-admin binding	Delete K8S events	Mount service principal	Access Kubelet API	Container service account	Resource hijacking
Kubeconfig file	New container	Kubernetes CronJob	hostPath mount	Pod/container name similarity	Access container service mount	Net work supping	Cluster Internal	Den al of
Application violerability	Application exploit (RCE)		Access o sud resturces	Connect from Proxy server	Applications credentials in configuration files	Accuss k8s cushboard	Applications credentials in configuration files	
Exposed comboard	SSH derver unt ng inside container					Instance Madata API	Writable volume mounts on the host	
							Access k8s V shboard	
							Access tiller endpoint	



### Look for ways to automate Network Policy management





#### **Step 3: Harden pod configurations**

- Configure security contexts for pods and/or containers
- Enforce policies on pod specifications
- Authorize policies by granting access to the pod's service account




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### Detect insecure pod configurations





#### Key takeaways and recommendations

- Use the Kubernetes attack matrix as your basis for systematically and comprehensively securing your containerized applications
- Applying a few native Kubernetes security features will mitigate most attacks:
  - Kubernetes RBAC
  - Kubernetes Network Policies
  - Restricted pod configurations
- You still need runtime monitoring!





Q&A